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RESTORING THE BALANCE OF POWER:
IMPEACHMENT AND THE TWENTY-SECOND AMENDMENT
The recent proceedings against President William Jefferson Clinton brought
Congress' impeachment power into the national spotlight. In the public debate on
when it is appropriate for Congress to exercise this power, it is important to
consider that the Framers gave this power to the legislature principally as a tool
to maintain a balance ofpower between the legislative and executive branches of
the federal government. Examining the debates at the Constitutional Convention,
this Note details how the Framers deliberately sought to balance the President's
term in office and eligibility for re-election with the Congress'impeachmentpower
in order to prevent one branch from attaining superiority over the other. This Note
argues that the Twenty-SecondAmendment, which limits the President to two terms
in office, has shifted the delicate balance ofpower established by the Framers in
favor of the legislative branch. The Note also suggests that the Framers' desired
balance ofpower between the two branches could be re-established more closely
if the phrase "high crimes and misdemeanors" in Article II of the Constitution were
to be construed narrowly.
INTRODUCTION
The impeachment proceedings in the fall and winter of 1998 and 1999 against
President William Jefferson Clinton provided a crash course forthe American public
in this unique constitutional power given to Congress. To those who did not simply
tune out the political din of the impeachment proceedings, armchair pundits across
the nation opined as to whether they believed the President's actions, in a phrase that
has now entered the popular lexicon, "rose to the level of an impeachable offense."
This Note is not about the Clinton impeachment per se, but it would be disingenuous
to suggest that it was not, at least in part, inspired by the proceedings. Discussions,
academic and popular, about the impeachment brought an arcane constitutional
phrase to the forefront of national discourse: "high Crimes and Misdemeanors.''
While this Note does not attempt principally to define this phrase, it does argue, from
constitutional structure and history, that it should be construed narrowly when used
against the President.2
U.S. CONST. art. II, § 4 ("The President, Vice President and all civil Officers of the
United States, shall be removed from Office on Impeachment for, and Conviction of,
Treason, Bribery, or other high Crimes and Misdemeanors.").
2 Although the impeachment power also can be used against the Vice President "and
all civil Officers of the United States," U.S. CONST. art. II, § 4, because the Twenty-Second
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The thesis ofthis Note is straightforward: the Twenty-Second Amendment to the
Constitution, which limits a President to two terms in office,3 requires that the
impeachment power held by the Congress--specifically, the definition of"high crimes
and misdemeanors"-be construed narrowly when used against the President. At first
blush, these two provisions in the Constitution, the President's term and the
Congress' impeachment power, seem to have little in common. The argument that
one should consider these provisions together is premised on the assumption that the
Framers constructed the Executive4 deliberately, in order to assure its internal
consistency and its relationship with the other branches of the federal government.
With respect to the other branches (especially the Legislature, with whose relationship
to the Executive this Note is primarily concerned), this relationship is commonly
referred to as the separation of powers with attendant "checks and balances." This
Note is concerned with the manner in which the Framers purposefully constructed,
or "constituted," the Executive and the matter in which this constitution of the
Executive is conceptualized in terms of a balance of power between itself and the
Legislature (the "external balance"). Second, continuing with the theme of balance,
there is implicitly an internal balance within the executive office. When the Framers
constructed the Executive, they sought to establish internal cohesion between its
constituent powers. Thus, when the Twenty-Second Amendment was ratified, it
changed the manner in which the presidency was constituted, throwing both the
internal and external constitution of the Executive out of balance. As a result of the
external imbalance caused by the Twenty-Second Amendment, this Note argues that
the impeachment power should be construed narrowly.
Principally, this Note presents an argument about the structure of the office of
the President as set forth in the Constitution. To advance this structural argument,
this Note relies primarily on the history surrounding the Constitution's drafting. 5 Part
Amendment pertains only to the President, this Note is concerned with the impeachment
power only when it is used against the President.
See U.S. CONST. amend. XXII, § 1.
4 A word about terminology is in order. Not until relatively late in the Constitutional
Convention did the title "President" arise; during most of the debate, the Framers used the
terms "the Executive" or "Executive Magistrate." Thus, seeking to reflect usage appropriate
to the context of the Convention debates, in the subsequent pages this Note uses "President"
only when the Convention delegates began using the term. References herein to the
Executive, then, unless clearly indicated by their context, do not refer to the executive
branch as it has evolved today, but to the Chief Executive.
' Because this Note examines impeachment (and its relationship to the Twenty-Second
Amendment) from the perspective of the Constitution's structure, it does not discuss the
considerable body of material surrounding the various impeachments that have taken place
in American history. These impeachments, judicial and Presidential, shed light on how the
impeachment power has been interpreted, and they are important primarily for addressing
that issue. This Note, however, considers why the Framers constructed the impeachment
power as they did and, in light of the Twenty-Second Amendment, what implications that
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I provides a brief tour through eighteenth-century Anglo-American political
philosophy, establishing the rudiments of the constitutional theory that influenced the
Framers. Drawing on the intellectual history of eighteenth-century political thought,
this Part argues that the Framers' constitutional ideal was rooted in the fear of
corruption and tyranny and the need for balance-balancing both the interests of
different factions in society and the "passions" that animate individual human beings.
Part II examines in detail the debates at the Constitutional Convention regarding the
internal balance of the Executive and why the Framers constituted that office the way
they did. This Part focuses especially on the troublesome issues facing the Framers
of deciding on the Executive's term in office and how his term related to internal and
external balance in the office-particularly the relationship between the President's
term and the Congress' power of impeachment. Having shown why the Framers
constituted the Executive in the manner they did, Part III argues that the Twenty-
Second Amendment throws out of balance the constitutional structure of the
Executive.
I. ENGLISH CONSTITUTIONAL THEORY IN THE PRE-REVOLUTIONARY ERA
The end of the French and Indian War in 1763 left England's colonists in
America generally content in their proud status as Englishmen. Within a few short
years, however, in response to Parliament's new programs to manage its empire more
closely (especially the taxation programs enacted, at least in part, to recover the cost
of protecting the colonies during the War), the colonists' attitudes changed
dramatically: they had come to believe that the Crown was corrupt.6 More
accurately, they believed that the vaunted English mixed constitution had become
corrupt.7
Not a written document like the subsequent American Constitution, the English
Constitution was the political arrangement that developed over many centuries and
which was formalized after the Glorious Revolution of 1688.8 Principally, the
constitution balanced the interests of what seventeenth-century Englishmen considered
to be the three natural "estates" in society: the monarchy, the aristocracy (through
the House of Lords), and the democracy (comprised of all other Englishmen,
represented by the House of Commons), or the One, the Few, and the Many." It was
a "mixed constitution" precisely because it constituted the government by mixing
construction has for the balance of power between the executive and legislative branches
of the federal government.
6 See GORDON S. WOOD, THE CREATION OF THE AMERICAN REPUBLIC, 1776-1787, at
10-17, 32-33 (1969).
7 See id
I See id at 10-11; FRANCIS D. WORMUTH, THE ORIGINS OF MODERN
CONSTITUTIONALISM 174-206 (1949).
9 See WOOD, supra note 6, at 18-20.
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together these three disparate estates with conflicting interests. "By balancing.., the
ancient contending interests of English society and by mixing within a single
government the several categories of politics that had been known to the Western
world for centuries, the English, it seemed, had concretely achieved what political
philosophers from antiquity on had only dreamed of."'"
The issue of balance between the interests of the three estates was crucial to the
English system, for any imbalance, it was feared, would wreak political havoc upon
the nation. Unchecked, a monarchy would naturally and inevitably devolve into
tyranny, an unchecked aristocracy into oligarchy, and an unchecked democracy into
anarchy." This fear of imbalance stemmed from the belief that a principal human
impulse was to exert power over others; the function of government, then, was to
preserve liberty for all Englishmen by restraining the power of each estate. 2
Englishmen, whether residing in England proper or in the colonies, shared this
general conception of constitutional theory. However, due to the American colonists'
position on the outskirts of the empire, seemingly alienated from the corridors of
power, a particularly radical strain of English political thought resonated with
them-a strain of thought hypersensitive to any perceived imbalance in the power
structure."' Gordon Wood refers to this strain of thought as the "Whig science of
politics."' 4 In the historiography of eighteenth-century England and America, the
terms "republicanism" or "classical republicanism" often are employed as well."' By
10 Id. at i1.
1 See BERNARD BAILYN, THE IDEOLOGICAL ORIGINS OF THE AMERICAN REVOLUTION
70 (enlarged ed. 1992) (1967) (explaining the three estates and their propensities); WOOD,
supra note 6, at 18-20.
12 See BAILYN, supra note 11, at 70.
In England, however, these elements of society [the three estates], each
independently dangerous, entered into government in such a way as to eliminate
the dangers inherent in each. They entered simultaneously, so to speak, in a
balanced sharing of power. The functions, the powers, of government were so
distributed among these components of society that no one of them dominated the
others. So long as each component remained within its proper sphere and
vigilantly checked all efforts of the others to transcend their proper boundaries
there would be a stable equilibrium of poised forces each of which, in protecting
its own rights against the encroachments of the others, contributed to the
preservation of the rights of all.
Id.
13 See WOOD, supra note 6, at 14-17; see also MARY BETH NORTON, THE BRITISH-
AMERICANS: THE LOYALIST EXILES IN ENGLAND, 1774-1789, at 141-45 (1972) (arguing
that the colonial Loyalists perceived the cause of the revolution as stemming from a radical
Whig (or "republican") ideology possessed by the self-styled Patriots).
'4 WOOD, supra note 6, at 3.
'" See, e.g., JOYCE APPLEBY,, Liberalism and Republicanism in the Historical
Imagination, in LIBERALISM AND REPUBLICANISM IN THE HISTORICAL IMAGINATION 1, 17-
23 (1992) [hereinafter APPLEBY, LIBERALISM AND REPUBLICANISM] (describing the
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the early eighteenth century, the English aristocracy had been tamed sufficiently, so
development of republican, or Whig, thought in 17th- and 18th-century England and its
explication by historians beginning in the 1960s).
To avoid unnecessary complication, only the barest outline of Whig/classical
republican thought is set forth in this Note. A considerable body of literature, however, has
examined the theme of classical republican political thought and ideology at the time of the
Revolution and through the early decades of the new nation's existence. For an overview
of the historiography of republicanism, see Robert E. Shalhope, Republicanism and Early
American Historiography, 39 WM. & MARY Q. 334-56 (1982), and Robert E. Shalhope,
Toward a Republican Synthesis: The Emergence of an Understanding of Republicanism
in American Historiography, 29 WM. & MARY Q. 49-80 (1972).
The "republican synthesis" is not without its critics. Most important are those who
assert that the ideological pretensions of republicanism often elide the influence of
liberalism (as derived from Lockean theory and as experienced in the developing market
economy of North America) on Revolutionary and post-Revolutionary America. Edward
Countryman provides perhaps the best one-sentence synopsis of these criticisms: "Beneath
[the] concern with republicanism as a mode of political relations lies an awareness that its
emergence was linked to that of liberalism as a mode of social relations and of capitalism
as a mode of economic production and exchange." Edward Countryman, OfRepublicanism,
Capitalism, and the "American Mind", 44 WM. & MARY Q. 556, 559 (1987).
Among the most trenchant critics are Joyce Appleby, see, e.g., the essays collected
in APPLEBY, LIBERALISM AND REPUBLICANISM, supra, especially Liberalism and the
American Revolution, 140, 160 (arguing that a "[t]ransformation of values" brought about
by demographic and economic changes throughout the eighteenth century "which
accompanied the intrusion of the market into social relations can scarcely be distinguished
from the liberal philosophy which found expression in revolutionary rhetoric"); The Social
Origins ofAmerican Revolutionary Ideology, 161, 163 (criticizing historians of classical
republicanism for constructing "a colonial past ill-adapted to serve as the story of the
beginnings of what was to come"); and Republicanism in Old and New Contexts, 320, 323
(arguing that a "classical republicanism" and a "liberal republicanism". "represent the
contending republican paradigms of Federalists and Jeffersonians" in the Founding and
Early National periods), John Patrick Diggins, see, e.g., JOHN PATRICK DIGGINS, THE LOST
SOUL OF AMERICAN POLITICS: VIRTUE, SELF-INTEREST, AND THE FOUNDATIONS OF
LIBERALISM, 16 (1984) (exploring the "dilemma of American politics" found in the tension
between "[cilassical political philosophy [which] aims to discipline man's desires and raise
him far above his vulgar wants" and liberalism, which "promises to realize desires and
satisfy wants"), and Isaac Kramnick, see, e.g., Isaac Kramnick, Republican Revisionism
Revisited, 87 American Historical Review 629, 635 (1982) (arguing that English and
American radicals in the late eighteenth century were much less likely to base their
arguments on the abstract notions of rights found in classical republicanism than on
"modem socioeconomic grievances" based on Lockean ideas, producing a critique of
governmental authority articulated in terms of property rights and opposition to taxation).
See also T.H. Breen, Ideology and Nationalism on the Eve of the American Revolution:
Revisions Once More in Need of Revising, 84 J. AM. HIST. 13, 35 (1997) (arguing that the
assertion of "national superiority" by England in the 1760s and 1770s caused the colonists
to develop a distinct sense of American national identity that gave salience to the otherwise
abstract theories of Locke: "Locke's political writings took on special significance for
people trying to resist the intrusive nationalism of the metropolitan state.").
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that for English Whigs, the contest for power had become one primarily between the
Crown and the Commons; Whigs sided with the Commons. 6 Whigs championed
government as "an essential restraint on the lusts and passions that drove all men"
and those chosen to rule were to protect the rights and liberties of the people. 7
The Whigs' definition of liberty also was rooted in power. Liberty was not the
absence of restraint; rather, liberty was the "minimal amount of power a man
deserved, because he was a man," the power "which every Man has over his own
Actions, and his Right to enjoy the Fruit of his Labour, Art, and Industry," the right
to control his own destiny, and the right to his life and property.' 8 Just as the Crown
could abuse its power by tyrannizing the people and subjecting them to slavery, the
people could abuse their power-their liberty--through licentiousness or anarchy that
would destabilize the social order. The Whigs' fear of anarchy, though, paled in
comparison with their fear of tyranny. 9
When Whigs looked at history, they saw repeated examples of rulers who abused
their trust, trampling the people's rights and making them surrender to the rulers'
arbitrary power. Indeed, Whigs regarded virtually all of human history as evidence
of civilizations seeking, but ultimately failing to achieve, lasting liberty. ° Liberty,
achieved through the balance of power in society, was like the apex of a triangle.
Even for those societies that were able to reach the apex, their attainment was
precarious, tenuous, and fleeting, devolving quickly into anarchy ortyranny-usually
tyranny. The English believed that they alone, through their glorious constitution,
had been able to achieve lasting balance and to sustain liberty.2' Yet, to persevere in
liberty, Whigs believed, required constant vigilance against corruption of the
constitution.2
It is worth noting at this point, if only by way of reminder, that the modern use
of the term "constitution" to refer to a document that sets forth the fundamental law
of a nation, such as the United States Constitution, is not the manner in which the
term was used in reference to the English Constitution. Rather, the term
"constitution" in the context under discussion here draws on a more basic definition
of the word: "the way in which a thing is made up; structure; organization.' '23 In the
16 See WOOD, supra note 6, at 20.
17 Id.
I Id. at2l.
'9 See id. at 23 ("'It is much easier to restrain liberty from running into licentiousness
than power from swelling into tyranny and oppression."' (quoting Josiah Quincy)).
20 See id. at 51-53.
2 See id. at 28-32 (describing the English as the only group of people in history to be
so "watchful of their liberty, and so successful in their struggles for it").
" See APPLEBY, LIBERALISM AND REPUBLICANISM, supra note 15, at 21 (stating that
the development of republican thought in seventeenth-century England "created a new
historical consciousness that produced a heightened sense of the dangers of corruption").
23 WEBSTER'S NEW WORLD DICTIONARY 298-99 (3d college ed. 1988); see also
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same way, when Revolutionary-era writers wrote of the "corruption" of the English
constitution, they were not referring to corruption in the way that one might do so
currently (in reference to bribery of a public official, for example). Corruption of the
constitution, in the eighteenth-century sense, meant disturbance of the precarious
balance of power between the Crown and the people.24 To be sure, that balance could
be upset by an act such as bribery. Yet, such an act evidenced corruption only
because bribery of a public official usurped the power of the people whose interests
the official was bound to protect.
25
By the 1770s, whiggish political observers on both sides of the Atlantic had
become profoundly pessimistic, seeing corruption in virtually every act of the
government:
[A]s the Whigs interpreted the events of the eighteenth century, the Crown
had been able to evade the restrictions of the revolutionary settlement of
1688 and had "found means to corrupt the other branches of the legislature,"
upsetting the delicately maintained balance of the constitution from within.
Throughoutthe eighteenth century the Crown had slyly avoided the blunt and
clumsy instrument of prerogative, and instead had resorted to influencing the
electoral process and the representatives in Parliament in order to gain its
treacherous ends. This seemed in the minds of devout Whigs a far more
subtle tyranny than the Stuarts' usurpations of the previous century, because
"the very means which were devised to secure and protect" the people had
become "the engines of destruction." George III was "now tearing up the
constitution by the roots, under the form of law." ... It appeared to those
who clung to original principles of the constitution and the growing tradition
of separation of powers that the Crown, in its painful efforts to build
majorities through borough-mongering and the distribution of patronage, was
in fact bribing its way into tyranny.26
BAILYN, supra note 11, at 66-69.
Like their contemporaries in England and like their predecessors for centuries
before, the colonists at the beginning of the Revolutionary controversy
understood by the word "constitution" not, as we would have it, a written
document or even an unwritten but deliberately contrived design of
government . . . ; they thought of it . . . as the constituted-that is,
existing-arrangement of governmental institutions, laws, and customs
together with the principles and goals that animated them.
Id. at 67-68.
24 See WOOD, supra note 6, at 32-33.
25 See id
26 Id. at 33.
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As if the Crown's efforts at subversion were not bad enough, Whigs observed the
lifestyles of ordinary people, flush with wealth due to increased trade from Britain's
ever-growing Empire. The people, Whigs believed, were blind to the Crown's
usurpations because they themselves were becoming corrupt-licentious, apathetic,
and ultimately inattentive to their civic duties." Commentators found haunting
parallels in classical Rome, which, they contended, fell after the Asian wars brought
previously unknown levels of luxury.2"
That corruption "which always begins among the Rich and the Great"
soon descended to the common people, leaving them "enfeebled and their
souls depraved." . . . With the character of the Roman people so
corrupted, dissolution had to follow. "The empire tottered on its own
foundation, and the mighty fabric sunk beneath its own weight.
'
"
29
Observing George III's machinations and what they perceived to be the growing
venality of English society, American Whigs feared the worst: that England had lost
its precarious balance at the apex of liberty and had begun the inevitable descent into
tyranny. It was in this light that Americans viewed the imperial taxation programs
of the 1760s and 1770s, most infamously, the Stamp Act, the Tea Act, and the
Intolerable Acts." With England a cauldron of corruption and on the verge of
tyranny, colonial patriots chose revolution not principally to gain independence from
Britain, they claimed, but to purify and to revitalize the English constitution and thus
to ensure for themselves the rights and liberties of Englishmen to which they were by
nature entitled.3
II. CONSTITUTIONAL THEORY IN THE NEW POLITICAL PARADIGM:
IMPEACHMENT AND THE STRUCTURE OF THE EXECUTIVE BRANCH
The American Revolution, of course, did away with the institutionalized authority
of monarchs and aristocrats in American government and society and thereby also
obviated the need for balancing the interests of the three traditional estates in the
United States Constitution. Likewise, conceptions of"tyranny", so closely tied prior
to the Revolution to the balance of power between the estates, evolved to fit the new
constitutional paradigm. This Part examines the manner in which the Framers, at the
Constitutional Convention, sought to constrain the nascent government's perceived
predilection toward tyranny; it pays particular attention to the debates surrounding
27 See id. at 35-36.
28 See id. (quoting editorials from 18th-century American newspapers).
29 Id. at 35.
30 See BAILYN, supra note 11, at 94-143.
31 See WOOD, supra note 6, at 43-45.
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the composition, power, and limitations of the executive branch. Ultimately, this
Part's focus is on how and why the impeachment power came to be structured in the
way it is in the United States Constitution, arguing that, although the impeachment
power is given distinctly to the Legislature, it is also an integral part of the
composition of the executive branch.
One might say that the Revolution decapitated the classical republican conception
of politics that had sought to balance the conflicting interests of rulers and those they
ruled; the ruler as a distinct entity was now gone, and the people would rule
themselves. In post-revolutionary America, government became a means
simultaneously to avoid anarchy and to promote the liberty and prosperity of
individuals.32 Yet, the government was never to be separate from the people; the
people breathed life into it through the Constitution, and the Constitution, in the hands
of the people was to be as "'clay in the hands of the potter:, they have the right to
mould, to preserve, to improve, to refine, and to furnish it as they please."' 33 James
Madison noted, "[T]he important distinction so well understood in America, between
a Constitution established by the people and unalterable by the government, and a law
established by the government and alterable by the government. 3 4 That is, the
government, through the people's Constitution, was to be the servant of the people,
not vice versa.
While the structure of government in the Constitution was designed to balance
the interests of the former colonies that had become independent states, one of the
purposes of government under the Constitution was to balance or reconcile the
competing interests that arose from among the people themselves. Accordingly, the
Constitution also was designed to prevent one legitimate interest from overwhelming
another.35 This modified political paradigm (i.e., balancing interests rather than
estates) produced an altered conception of"tyranny"-a fundamental concept that
fueled the Revolution and retained salience in the new nation. Tyranny came to be
regarded as the abuse of power by any branch of government.36 Madison, in
Federalist Nos. 47 and 48, explained why the separation of powers provisions in the
proposed Constitution must be tempered with the checks and balances provisions;
otherwise, unchecked, one branch conceivably could aggregate all power in itself and
"[t]he accumulation of all powers, legislative, executive, and judiciary, in the same
hands, whether of one, a few, or many, and whether hereditary, self-appointed, or
32 See generally GORDON S. WOOD, THE RADICALISM OF THE AMERICAN REVOLUTION
(1991).
" WOOD, supra note 6, at 600-01 (quoting James Wilson of Pennsylvania).
14 THE FEDERALIST NO. 53, at 365 (James Madison) (Benjamin Fletcher Wright ed.,
1961).
31 See WOOD, supra note 6, at 608.
36 See id ("'The accumulation of all powers,. . . legislative, executive, and judiciary,
in the same Lords... may justly be pronounced the very definition of tyranny."' (quoting
James Madison)).
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elective, may justly be pronounced the very definition of tyranny."37 By making
pointed reference to "one, a few, or many" and "hereditary" power, Madison
implicitly linked the specter of tyranny under the English constitution with the
continuing need for vigilance against tyranny under the new United States
Constitution.
When the Constitutional Convention convened in Philadelphia in May of 1787,
in addition to the copious personal study of classical and contemporary political
writing in which many of the delegates had engaged, these men also drew on a decade
of practical experience in trying to establish just republican governments in the
thirteen former colonies. 3' Each state had devised its own constitution, and some
were regarded as providing better models than others for the proposed federal
constitution.39 Some states had bicameral legislatures, some unicameral.40 Some
employed a single governor or president in the executive, while others had,
effectively, an executive committee.4' The most pressing issue for the Framers,
exemplified in the various state constitutions, was whether to create a powerful
legislature. Indeed, chary of the specter of monarchical power vested in an individual
executive, in breaking with Britain, many states sought to democratize government
by exalting the legislature.42 In many cases, the judiciary and the executive were
secondary to the legislature; they were appointed by the legislature and serving at its
pleasure.43 Observing human nature at work once again, many of the delegates in
Philadelphia likely agreed with Madison's sentiment that "[e]xperience in all the
States had evinced a powerful tendency in the Legislature to absorb all power into its
vortex; '44 the corollary to this observation was that tyranny would result from an
unchecked legislature. Thus, in the course of the Constitutional Convention, the need
for a powerful Executive, whose authority arose apart from the legislature and who
31 THE FEDERALIST NO. 47, supra note 34, at 336 (James Madison).
38 See generally WOOD, supra note 6, at 127-255 (discussing in detail the constitutions
of the states).
39 See id
40 See id.
4' See id.
42 See id.
43 See id
44 JAMES MADISON, NOTES OF DEBATES IN THE FEDERAL CONVENTION OF 1787, at 338
(Adrienne Koch ed., Ohio University Press 1966) (1840) [hereinafter MADISON'S NOTES];
see also THE FEDERALISTNO. 49, supra note 34, at 350 (James Madison) ("[T]he tendency
of republican governments is to an aggrandizement of the legislative at the expense of the
other departments."); MADISON'S NOTES, supra at 312:
Experience had proved a tendency in our governments to throw all power into
the Legislative vortex. The Executives of the States are in general little more
than Cyphers; the legislatures omnipotent. If no effectual check be devised for
restraining the instability & encroachments of the latter, a revolution of some
kind or other would be inevitable.
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could act as a check on the legislature, became apparent to many of the delegates.
Edmund Randolph,45 a prominent member ofthe Virginia delegation, submitted
what came to be known as the Virginia Plan to the Convention on its first day of
substantive debate, Tuesday, May 29, 1787.46 Article Seven of the Virginia Plan
concerned the appointment of a National Executive magistracy.47 When delegates
began to debate Article Seven on June 1, the first speaker to rise and comment with
respect tothe proposed Executive, Charles Pinckney of South Carolina, expressed the
fear that it might become a monarchy.4" Pinckney's statement begged the question
of whether the functions of the Executive would be fulfilled by an individual or a
committee-a question the delegates addressed next. James Wilson of Pennsylvania
preferred a single executive magistrate "as giving most energy dispatch and
responsibility to the office,"49 while Randolph thought that a committee of three
would be as effective, and more independent, than a single magistrate and feared that
a single magistrate would be the "[fetus] of monarchy."5 Wilson replied that "unity
in the Executive instead of being the fetus of monarchy would be the best safeguard
against tyranny."'" Due to the consensus of subsequent speakers that an Executive
comprised of more than one member probably would be ineffectual because of
disagreements among its members, the Convention chanced the specter of monarchy
and agreed that a single individual would constitute the Executive.52
A. The Term of the Executive and its Relationship to the Legislature
The term for which the Executive would hold office was a crucial issue for the
Framers and was intimately affected by a number of other issues. This Note shall
"5 A word is in order about the spelling of the names of delegates to the Constitutional
Convention. Spellings were considerably more fluid in the eighteenth century than they are
today. A particularly good example is the name of John Dickenson of Delaware, whose
name also is frequently spelled "Dickinson." See, e.g., THE WRITINGS OF JOHN DICKINSON
(Paul Leicester Ford ed., 1895). For the sake of consistency, then, in this Note, delegates'
names are spelled as they appear in MADISON'S NOTES, supra note 44.
46 See MADISON'S NOTES, supra note 44, at 28. The Convention formally had convened
on Friday, May 25, but all business on that day and on Monday, May 28, consisted merely
of housekeeping matters. Randolph's proposal was the first substantive issue submitted to
the Convention, and, as the Virginia delegates no doubt hoped, it provided the foundation
for all subsequent debate.
41 See id at 3 I.
48 See id at 45. Pinckney averred that, although he favored a "vigorous Executive," he
feared that if its powers extended to executing "peace & war," this "would render the
Executive a monarchy, of the worst kind, to wit an elective one." Id.
49 Id. at 46.
50 Id.
I' Id. at 47.
12 See id. at 60.
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examine the constitution of the Executive from the perspective of the length of the
term to see how the following issues interrelate. First, and most importantly, fearing
the monarchic tendencies of a single executive officer, the Framers believed that the
more closely they tethered the Executive to the Legislature, the longer his term of
office could be. Second, the delegates debated whether the Executive should be
eligible for re-election to subsequent terms in office. Third, the delegates discussed
extensively the specific powers to be given to the Executive, especially the
Executive's authority over the military and his veto power. Fourth, the delegates
intentionally limited the power of impeachment vested in the Legislature in relation
to the power given the Executive, his term of office, and his eligibility for re-election.
The delegates regarded each of these issues as fundamental to the constitution of the
Executive, and each shaped the Executive's independence from or dependence on the
Legislature. The Executive, then, was the great "push-me/pull-you" of the
Constitutional Convention: each change fundamentally affected other aspects of the
Executive's composition. Indeed, in the words of Gouvemor Morris of Pennsylvania,
"It is the most difficult of all rightly to balance the Executive. Make him too weak:
The Legislature will usurp his powers: Make him too strong. He will usurp the
Legislature."53
1. Appointment of the Executive:54 By the Legislature or by the People?
The delegates realized that every power given to the executive branch meant
weakening the relative strength of the Legislature, and while they wished to avoid
oligarchic tyranny by the Legislature, they also did not want to establish so strong an
Executive that the inevitable pull of monarchy might triumph. Both the Virginia Plan
and the New Jersey Plan contemplated an Executive elected by the Legislature.55
Throughout the debates, the thorny issues surrounding the method of selecting the
Executive persisted; alternative suggestions included the direct election of the
Executive by the people, or through electors (which, naturally, raised the related
problem of how the electors would be chosen).
5 Id. at 361.
s Throughout his notes on the Convention, Madison employed the terms "appointment"
and "election" of the Executive by the Legislature without providing any clear distinction
between them. When the Convention began to consider public election of the Executive,
whether directly or through electors, Madison always employed the term "election". When
discussing the debates, this Note will always use the term that is appropriate to the context
of the debate.
" See MADISON'S NOTEs, supra note 44, at 31, 119 (setting forth, respectively, the
Virginia Plan by Edmund Randolph and the New Jersey Plan by William Patterson, both
of which were proposals for the federal constitution).
[Vol. 8:3
RESTORING THE BALANCE OF POWER
The Virginia Plan suggested that the Executive "be chosen by the National
Legislature for a term of [blank] years,"56 and the New Jersey Plan suggested,
similarly, "that the U. States in Cong[ress] be authorized to elect a federal
Executive... to continue in office for the term of [blank] years."57 Both plans left
the term of years open to debate. When debate was first opened on this issue under
the Virginia Plan, James Wilson of Pennsylvania spoke in favor of election by the
people; Roger Sherman of Connecticut, however,
was for the appointment by the Legislature, and for making [the
Executive] absolutely dependent on that body, as it was the will of that
[body] which was to be executed. An independence of the Executive
[from] the supreme Legislature, was in his opinion the very essence of
tyranny if there was any such thing.5"
The debate on this issue would continue to swing between these two poles-the
dependence and the independence of the Executive vis-a-vis the Legislature, as well
as the relative dependence of either of these bodies on the state governments. Wilson
averred not only that the Executive and Legislature should be independent of each
other, but that both should be independent of the state governments.59 Later, Wilson
modified his suggestion, submitting for the first time the idea of electors to represent
the will of the people in choosing the executive magistrate. Election without the
intervention of the states, he asserted, "would produce more confidence among the
people in the first magistrate, than an election by the national Legislature."60 Elbridge
Gerry of Massachusetts opined that if the Executive were elected by the National
Legislature, "[t]here would be a constant intrigue kept up for the appointment," and
that corrupt quidpro quo arrangements would result between the Executive and
members of the Legislature.6 This initial debate ended with support for the idea that
the Executive be elected by the Legislature for a term of seven years.62
When the Convention revisited the issue of appointment of the Executive on July
17, however, Gouvernor Morris of Pennsylvania opposed appointment by the
Legislature because the Executive would "be the mere creature of the Legisl[ature]:
if appointed & impeachable by that body."63 Election by the Legislature, Morris
56 Id. at 31.
17 Id. at 119.
58 Id. at 48.
" See id at 50. Earlier, during debate on the election of House members, Sherman had
suggested that they be selected by the State legislatures rather than popularly elected as
suggested in the Virginia Plan. See id at 39.
60 Id. at 50.
61 Id. at 50-51.
62 See id. at 51.
63 Id. at 306.
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averred, "will be the work of intrigue, of cabal, and of faction"--in other words,
election by the Legislature would lead to corruption." To drive home his point,
Morris invoked references to Roman Catholicism, the embodiment of anti-republican
tyranny for the Founders' generation: "[I]t will be like the election of a pope by a
conclave of cardinals."65 Opponents of popular election mounted various arguments:
the Legislature would be better able to express the "sense of the Nation;" the people
could never be as well informed as the Legislators of a candidate's "character;"
individuals would vote for someone from their own state, putting the small states at
a disadvantage; and the common people-their prudence always in question by
eighteenth-century gentlemen such as the Convention's delegates-would be led into
voting "by a few active & designing men," while the National Legislature would "be
most attentive to the choice of a fit man to carry [its laws] properly into execution. 66
Proponents of popular election, however, retorted that all the people of so large a
country could not possibly be led astray by "'a few active & designing men."' 67 The
core of their argument, however, was that "[i]f the Executive be chosen by the
Nat[ional] Legislature, he will not be independent [of] it; and if not independent,
usurpation & tyranny on the part of the Legislature will be the consequence.,
61
The Convention next addressed the question of the Executive's appointment when
debating whether his term should be renewable. In opposing a non-renewable term
for the Executive, Gouvernor Morris argued that such a large country demanded "an
Executive with sufficient vigor to pervade every part of it."'69 Indeed, Morris
continued:
One great object of the Executive is to controul the Legislature. The
Legislature will continually seek to aggrandize & perpetuate themselves;
and will sieze those critical moments produced by war, invasion or
convulsion for that purpose. It is necessary then that the Executive
Magistrate should be the guardian ofthe people, even of the lower classes,
ag[ainst] Legislative tyranny, against the Great & the wealthy who in the
course of things will necessarily compose the Legislative body."
Morris believed in a strong Executive, independent of the Legislature, who would
64 Id.
65 Id.
66 Id. at 306-07; see also id at 368 (quoting Elbridge Gerry's assertion that, were a
popular election to be enacted, "[tihe ignorance of the people would put it in the power of
some one set of men dispersed through the Union & acting in Concert to delude them into
any appointment").
67 Id. at 307 (statement of Charles Pinckney).
61 Id. at 308.
69 Id. at 322.
70 Id. at 322-23.
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control the military and, if necessary, use it to protect the people from legislative
overreaching.7
When the issue arose again in debate some weeks later, Morris argued that if
elected by the Legislature, the Executive would be "uninterested in maintaining the
rights of his Station, as leading to Legislative tyranny."72 Indeed, he asserted, an
Executive with a limited term would still have reason to curry favor with the
Legislature:
If the Legislature have the Executive depe[n]dent on them, they can
perpetuate & support their usurpations by the influence of tax-gatherers &
other officers, by fleets armies &c. Cabal & corruption are attached to that
mode ofelection: so also is ineligibility a second time. Hence the Executive
is interested in Courting popularity in the Legislature by sacrificing his
Executive Rights; & then he can go into that Body, after the expiration of his
Executive office, and enjoy there the fruits of his policy. To these
considerations he added that rivals would be continually intrigueing to oust
the President from his place. 3
James Madison also argued that the Executive should not be appointed by the
Legislature, but should be elected by the people:
If it be a fundamental principle of free Govt. that the Legislative,
Executive & Judiciary powers should be separately exercised, it is equally
so that they be independently exercised. There is the same & perhaps
greater reason why the Executive [should] be independent of the
Legislature, than why the Judiciary should: A coalition of the two former
powers would be more immediately & certainly dangerous to public
liberty. It is essential then that the appointment of the Executive should
either be drawn from some source, or held by some tenure, that will give
him a free agency with regard to the Legislature. This could not be if he
was appointable from time to time by the Legislature.74
Madison asserted that election by the people was far superior to appointment by the
Legislature. There was one problem, however, with such an election: suffrage was
far more "diffusive" in the North than in the South, because slaves could not vote in
the South.75 Madison thought a system of electors would obviate the problem posed
See id. at 322-25.
72 Id. at 525.
71 Id. at 525-26.
71 Id. at 326-27.
71 See id. at 327.
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by non-voting slaves by establishing a program closely akin to direct election that
would give the southern states a number of electors in accordance with their
population.76 Madison's separation of powers argument, rooted in the desire to
prevent an Executive and Legislative "coalition" that would be "dangerous to public
liberty," ultimately carried the day on this issue and, as the Convention continued,
infused the subsequent design of these two branches of the federal government.77
2. Limited Term or an Open-Ended Executive?
The context of Madison's separation of powers argument, during debate on the
election of the Executive, clearly shows how the Convention struggled to find balance
when constituting the various aspects ofthe Executive. Similar struggles ensued with
another principal issue surrounding the Executive's constitution: Whether the
delegates could provide the Executive with adequate power and autonomy without
making him subservient to or too independent from the Legislature. Throughout the
Convention, the Framers continued to debate and alter the balance between these
central issues: the manner of the Executive's election, the duration of his term in
office, whether he could be re-elected for subsequent terms, and the possibility and
extent of any impeachment power held by the Legislature.78
The Framers, as discussed above, worked within a whiggish frame of reference,
believing that the desire for power, influence, and wealth were part of human nature,
and that wise governments must be designed to allow men to exercise these passions
in a controlled and productive, rather than a licentious and destructive, manner.79
Thus, Gouvernor Morris believed that if a powerful Executive were not given the
possibility of being "rewarded with a reappointment" to this post of honor then he
might stage a coup. "Shut the Civil road to Glory," Morris warned, and "he may be
compelled to seek it by the sword."8 Further, Morris believed that a finite term for
the Executive might cause him to "make the most of the short space of time allotted
him, to accumulate wealth and provide for his friends," and would ultimately
"produce violations of the very constitution it is meant to secure." 81 Morris argued
for complete independence of the Executive from the Legislature: "He saw no
76 See id The problem, more clearly stated, was that if the President were to be elected
-by popular vote from the country as a whole, the northern states would have a far greater
advantage because a higher 'percentage of their population could vote. With electors
interposed, however, and allotted according to population, each of the states would have a
more equitable number of votes for President.
" See id at 326-27.
78 See supra text accompanying notes 54-77.
79 See supra text accompanying notes 13-17.
'o MADISON'S NOTES, supra note 44, at 323.
"' Id. Morris also stated that making the Executive ineligible for re-appointment was
like saying to him, "make hay while the sun shines." Id. at 310.
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alternative for making the Executive independent of the Legislature but either to give
him his office for life, or make him eligible by the people." 2 Morris suggested a two-
year term, election by the people, the possibility of re-election, and no impeachment
power held by the legislature over the principal Executive, but only over subordinate
officers.83
Edmund Randolph of Virginia disagreed with Morris' recommendations.
Randolph argued that making the Executive ineligible for reappointment would be the
better course of action because it would increase his independence from the
Legislature. 4 If more than one term were possible, Randolph argued, the Executive
would be "under a temptation to court a re-appointment. If he should be re-
appointable by the Legislature, he will be no check on it. His revisionary [i.e., veto]
power will be of no avail." 5 Furthermore, Randolph argued, if the Executive is
eligible for re-appointment by the Legislature, the Legislature may prefer "to continue
an unfit man in office in preference to a fit one." 6 Although he disagreed with
Morris' recommendations, Randolph implicitly accepted Morris' whiggish
assumptions: the machinations of a corrupt Executive who would seek to usurp
power could "have no effect unless the people be corrupt to such a degree as to render
all precautions hopeless. 87 James Wilson of Pennsylvania expressed what he
perceived to be the growing consensus of the delegates: "that the Executive should
not be appointed by the Legislature, unless he be rendered in-eligible a 2d time. 88
Contrary to Randolph's desire, however, Wilson "perceived with pleasure that the
idea was gaining ground, of an election mediately or immediately by the people. 8 9
Elbridge Gerry of Massachusetts concurred, "If the Executive is to be elected by the
Legislature he certainly ought not to be re-eligible. This would make him absolutely
dependent" on the Legislature." Ratifying the motion of Connecticut's Oliver
Ellsworth, the delegates agreed that the Executive would be elected by electors
appointed by the several state legislatures, not the national Legislature. 9' On a
separate motion, the Convention affirmed that the Executive would be eligible for a
second term.92
The Convention revisited the issue a few days later. The delegates carried a
motion that the Executive be elected by the Legislature, then Luther Martin of
62 Id. at 325.
I See id at 324-25.
4 See id. at 325.
85 Id.
86 Id.
7 Id. at 326.
8 Id.
s9 Id.
90 Id. at 327.
9' See id. at 328.
92 See id at 329.
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Maryland and Elbridge Gerry moved to reinstate the ineligibility ofthe Executive for
a second term.9 While Gerry agreed that the Executive should be independent from
the Legislature, he suggested, "The longer the duration of his appointment the more
will his dependence be diminished."94 Therefore, Gerry suggested that it would be
"better then for him to continue 10, 15, or even 20, years and be ineligible
afterwards."'9 Rufus King of Massachusetts thought that re-eligibility combined with
the Legislature's impeachment power would amount to tenure at their pleasure; amid
various other suggestions of eleven, fifteen, and eight years, King suggested, perhaps
in jest, a twenty year, renewable term for the Executive.96 James Wilson said that he
would agree to practically any length of tenure for the Executive, provided that he
was not elected by the Legislature, because of "the dependence which must result
from" such an election.97 Wilson believed that a "capacity & inclination for public
service existed"98 when a man reached the later stages of life and that to restrict an
Executive from holding office by an arbitrarily mandated short tenure would deprive
the country of his accumulated wisdom just as he reached the prime of life."
Charles Pinckney of South Carolina moved that election by the Legislature be
qualified: the Executive would have a six-year term, but could hold office for no
more than six of any twelve-year period. '00 He believed this would avoid most of the
objections to election by the Legislature (i.e., that the Executive would be
compromised by seeking the Legislature's favor), while also meeting the objections
lodged against an absolute bar to re-election (i.e., Gouvemor Morris' contention that
an ambitious Executive might resort to force to secure his place in office).'' Pierce
Butler, also representing South Carolina, rejoined that the Government "should not
be made so complex & unwieldy as to disgust the States," and argued for election by
electors chosen by the state legislatures."0 2 Regardless, Butler was against re-
eligibility "at all events."'0 3 Morris also argued against Pinckney's proposal. By
seeking to avoid the undue influence of the Legislature, Morris stated, this plan would
result in "instability of Councils" because any change in administration "is ever
followed by a change of measures."'0 4
9' See id at 358.
94 Id.
95 Id.
96 See id. Madison's footnote suggested, "This might possibly be meant as a caricature
of the previous motions in order to defeat the object of them." Id. at 358 n.4.
97 Id.
98 Id. at 359.
9 See id. at 358-59.
'o See id at 366.
101 See id
102 Id.
103 Id.
'04 Id. at 367.
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3. Powers of the Executive
There were two specific powers of the Executive that gave the Framers pause and
to which this Note shall give attention: the Executive's role as Commander in Chief
of the nation's armed forces and his veto power over legislation. While seeking to
keep the Executive independent of the Legislature, in each of these areas the Framers
saw the potential for corruption and tyranny.
a. Commander in Chief of the Military
The Virginia Plan did not assign the role of Commander in Chief to the
Executive. Its only mention of military power was to permit the Legislature to "call
forth the force of the Union ag[ainst] any member of the Union failing to fulfill its
duty under the articles thereof."' 5 The New Jersey Plan gave the Executive the
power "to direct all military operations; provided that none ofthe persons composing
the federal Executive shall on any occasion take command of any troops, so as
personally to conduct any enterprise as General or in other capacity."'0 6 Clearly, the
object of this qualification of the executive power was to give the Executive general
authority over the military forces, while keeping him from exercising any direct
control that could be used to effect a coup.
We have already encountered Gouvernor Morris' fear that the Executive, if
denied the possibility of re-election, might be compelled to seek glory "by the
sword,"'0 7 and Charles Pinckney's fear that extending the power of "peace & war"
to the Executive "would render the Executive a monarchy, of the worst kind, to wit
an elective one."' ' Other delegates harbored similar fears. Roger Sherman of
Connecticut expressed this fear most directly, when he objected to the power to
appoint military officers during times of peace, which was given to the President in
an early draft of the Constitution. "Herein lay the corruption in G[reat] Britain,"
Sherman warned. "If the Executive can model the army, he may set up an absolute
Government; taking advantage of the close of a war and an army commanded by his
creatures."'0 9 When considering the issue of impeachment, then, Edmund Randolph
id. at 31.
.o6 Id at 120.
107 Id. at 323; see also supra text accompanying note 80.
'os MADISON'S NOTES, supra note 44, at 45; see also supra note 48.
'09 MADISON'S NOTES, supra note 44, at 527. Here, Sherman draws on a long-standing
fear in England and the American colonies that a standing army is likely to be used as a
tool of oppression. See, e.g., THE FEDERALIST NO. 8 supra note 34, at 120-21 (Alexander
Hamilton) (arguing that although standing armies are "problematical and uncertain," the
political exigencies of the new nation require them); THE FEDERALIST NO. 26 supra note
34, at 214-15 (Alexander Hamilton) (stating that, due to the use of standing armies by the
despotic monarchs Charles II and James II, in order to "to abolish the exercise of so
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favored endowing the Legislature with the power to impeach, because "[t]he
Executive will have great opportunitys of abusing his power; particularly in time of
war when the military force.., will be in his hands."" For these reasons, along
with the power of impeachment the Framers gave the power to declare war to the
Legislature, although they anticipated that due to the slow, deliberate nature of a
legislative body, the Executive as Commander in Chief should have "the power to
repel sudden attacks."'' .
b. The Veto Power
The veto power--or, as it was generally called in the Convention, the revisionary
power-brought forward profound issues concerning the independence of the
Executive from the Legislature. With the veto power, the Executive possessed some
considerable independence from the Legislature; without it, he was merely its puppet.
There was little disagreement that the Executive should possess a veto, but there was
great disagreement on how broadly it could be exercised and how the Legislature
might overcome it. As with all the issues surrounding the constitution of the
Executive, seemingly minute adjustments in an area such as the veto power required
reconsideration of other, seemingly unrelated issues such as impeachment.
The best example of such adjustments arose when the penultimate draft of the
Constitution was presented to the whole Convention on September 12, 1787, after
being assembled and published by the "Committee of Stile & arrangement.""' 2 Some
delegates wished to fine-tune certain portions of the document; Article I, Section 7,
clause 3, which set forth the ability of the Congress to override the President's veto
by a three-fourths vote," 3 elicited the first motion for reconsideration. Hugh
Williamson ofNorth Carolina moved to substitute two-thirds instead ofthree-fourths
to override a veto, as three-fourths "puts too much in the power of the President." ' 4
Roger Sherman of Connecticut concurred, adding that the sense of the people could
easily be thwarted by "so small a minority [i.e., one-quarter of each House] and the
President, prevailing over the general voice."' '" Elbridge Gerry of Massachusetts
detected a possibility of corruption in a three-quarters requirement and characterized
the veto power as primarily an element of the separation of powers:
dangerous an authority," following the Glorious Revolution "the raising or keeping a
standing army within the kingdom in time of peace, unless with the consent of Parliament,
was against the law").
..0 MADISON'S NOTES, supra note 44, at 334.
... Id. at 476.
112 Id. at616
"' See id. at 619.
114 Id. at 628.
115 Id.
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[Three-fourths] puts too much in the power of a few men. The primary
object of the revisionary check of the President is not to protect the
general interest, but to defend his own department. If 3/4 be required, a
few Senators having hopes from the nomination of the President to offices,
will combine with him and impede proper laws. Making the vice-
President Speaker [of the Senate] increases the danger." 6
In arguing in favor of retaining the three-fourths requirement, Gouvernor Morris
returned to the issue of the President's term (which, in the draft under consideration,
was the same as in the draft ultimately ratified-four years, elected by electors
appointed by the states, and not limiting the possibility of re-election), arguing that
"[i]f one man in office will not consent where he ought, every fourth year another can
be substituted.""' James Madison also noted, "When 3/4 was agreed to, the
President was to be elected by the Legislature and for seven years," again calling
attention to the close relationship between the method of election, the duration of the
President's term, and the structure of the veto power." 8 Madison continued, arguing
that the purpose of the veto was both "to defend the Executive Rights," as Gerry had
suggested, and "to prevent popular and factious injustice. '' H9 As such, the veto
power "was an important principle .. . to check legislative injustice and
incroachments."' 2° Over Madison's and Morris' protests, the amendment substituting
two-thirds for three-fourths passed.'
4. The Impeachment Power in the Legislature
Similar to the other elements constituting the Executive, the power of
impeachment vested in the Congress does not exist in a vacuum, but is one element
in a delicately balanced system designed to distribute power between the Executive
and the Legislature. Raoul Berger demonstrated the English heritage of the
impeachment power fromwhich the Framers derived the concept. 2 2 Yet, the Framers
did not simply import English notions of impeachment. Rather, they took the term
and the rudimentary conceptual apparatus they received from English law and
116 Id.
"I Id. at 629.
'is Id.
119 Id.
120 Id.
121 See id at 629-30.
122 See RAOUL BERGER, IMPEACHMENT: THE CONSTITUTIONAL PROBLEMS 7-55 (1974);
see also PETER CHARLES HOFFER& N.E.H. HULL, IMPEACHMENT IN AMERICA, 1635-1805,
at 3-56 (1984) (discussing how impeachment originated with English law and its adoption
in America).
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reinterpreted it, fitting it carefully into the new political paradigm.' 23 Historically a
broad power in England, directed at ordinary citizens as well as government
officials,'24 the Framers drastically limited its scope. Under the Constitution, it would
apply only to "[t]he President, Vice President and all civil Officers of the United
States" who were impeached for and convicted of "Treason, Bribery, or other high
Crimes and Misdemeanors."'25
Initially, the Virginia Plan had given the Judiciary the power to "hear &
determine" impeachments of any federal officer. 2' On June 2, during the first course
of debate on the Plan, John Dickenson of Delaware moved "that the Executive be
made removeable by the National Legislature on the request of a majority of the
Legislatures of individual States."' 2 7 Roger Sherman suggested that the National
Legislature should have the powerto remove the Executive at its pleasure.' 2 George
Mason "decidedly" objected to this suggestion, because it would make the Executive
"the mere creature of the Legislature," which would be "a violation of the
fundamental principle of good Government.' ' 29 Dickenson's motion failed, but
almost immediately thereafter a motion passed without discussion to make the
Executive "removeable on impeachment & conviction ofmal-practice or neglect of
duty."
130
The New Jersey Plan, submitted on June 15, incorporated some ideas similar to
the suggestions Dickenson had made earlier. The Executive, which would be
appointed by the Legislature, was also "removeable by Cong[ress] on application by
a majority of the Executives of the several States.' 3 ' The Legislature, however,
possessed no impeachment power, for this power was reserved to the Judiciary, which
would have the "authority to hear & determine.., on all impeachments of federal
officers."13 2
23 See MICHAEL J. GERHARDT, THE FEDERAL IMPEACHMENT PROCESS: A
CONSTITUTIONAL AND HISTORICAL ANALYSIS 3 (1996) ("[T]he framers set forth a special
impeachment mechanism in the Constitution that reflected their intention to differentiate
the newly proposed federal impeachment process from the English and state experiences
with impeachment prior to 1787.").
124 See id. at 4-5.
125 U.S. CONST. art. II, § 4.
126 See MADISON'S NOTES, supra note 44, at 32.
127 Id. at 55 (emphasis added). Interestingly, Dickenson differentiated impeachment from
the removal of the Executive in the manner he proposed-indeed, he was opposed to
"impeaching the Great officers of State"-but he did not elaborate on the difference
between removal and impeachment. Id
128 See id. at 56.
29 Id. at 56.
130 Id. at 57-58.
"' Id. at 120.
132 Id
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Like Dickenson's efforts, the New Jersey Plan sought to "sustain[ ] the
sovereignty of the respective States" against the perceived nationalizing tendencies
of the Virginia Plan.' 33 Not surprisingly; the introduction of the New Jersey Plan
sparked vigorous debate over the advisability of pursuing a strong national
government rather than simply strengthening some of the weaknesses in the Articles
-of Confederation. 34 Representing New York, Alexander Hamilton rose during this
discussion and offered a different plan--quite the opposite of the New Jersey Plan
and consciously modeled on the British system. Hamilton proposed that the lower
house of the Legislature (the "Assembly") be elected by the people for three years. 35
The Senate and the Executive "Governour," however, as well as all federal judges,
would be elected by electors chosen by the people, and would serve "during good
behaviour."' 131 In Hamilton's mind, this was the closest Americans could get to the
ideal English system without fabricating a hereditary monarch and an aristocracy. 137
"The Governour[,] Senators[,] and all officers of the United States" would be liable
for "impeachment for mal- and corrupt conduct", and would be "removed from
office, & disqualified [from] holding any place of trust or profit."' 38 These
impeachments would be tried by the chiefjudge of the supreme court of each state,
"provided such Judge shall hold his place during good behavior, and have a
permanent salary."''
39
The issue of impeachment in all of these plans sought to provide some check on
potentially tyrannical or corrupt officers. During the course of the debates, the
impeachment provisions in the Constitution changed in direct proportion to the
Framers' tinkering with the composition of the executive office. When debating a
motion that the Executive serve during good behavior, George Mason of Virginia
strenuously objected to the proposition, for an Executive holding office during good
behavior was "a softer name only for an Executive for life," from which it would be
"an easy step to hereditary Monarchy."' 40 Neither did Mason think impeachment for
misbehavior was an appropriate check on a nascent monarchy, for it would "be
impossible to define the misbehaviour in such a manner as to subject it to a proper
trial."'' When impeachment itself came up for debate later in the week, Charles
Pinckney opined that the Executive "ought not to be impeachable whilst-in office;"
thus, Pinckney and Gouvernor Morris moved that the portion of the plan permitting
the Executive "to be removeable on impeachment and conviction for mal practice or
3 Id. at 121.
134 See id at 121-29.
135 See id at 138 (§ II).
136 Id. at 138 (§§ III, IV, and VII).
137 See id. at 134-37.
13 Id. at 139 (§ IX).
139 Id.
140 Id at 312.
141 Id.
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neglect of duty" be excised.' William Davie of North Carolina disagreed:
impeachment was "an essential security for the good behaviour of the Executive."'
43
Arguing in support of his own motion, Gouvernor Morris noted the obvious point that
impeachment, to have any substance, must "suspend his functions.' 44 If this is the
result, Morris argued, "impeachment will be nearly equivalent to a displacement, and
will render the Executive dependent on those who are to impeach." Charles
Pinckney agreed: ifthere must be impeachments, he thought, "they ought not to issue
from the Legislature who would in that case hold them as a rod over the Executive
and by that means effectually destroy his independence."' 146 If the Legislature were
able to impeach, Pinckney argued further, the Executive's veto power "would be
rendered altogether insignificant."4 4 Rufus King of Massachusetts argued that, as
the Executive was to be appointed for a limited term, "he would periodically be tried
for his behaviour by his electors, who would continue or discontinue him" according
to his performance in office; thus, King argued, "he ought to be subject to no
intermediate trial, by impeachment."'' 48 King conceded that impeachments should be
permitted if the Executive were to hold his office, like members of the Judiciary,
during good behavior-but "under no circumstances ought he to be impeachable by
the Legislature," for this "would be destructive of his independence and of the
principles of the Constitution.' 49 Edmund Randolph upheld the "propriety of
impeachments," believing that "[g]uilt wherever found ought to be punished."'150
Because the Executive would "have great opportunitys of abusing his power," ifthere
were "no regular punishment" to be provided, Randolph feared that "tumults &
insurrections" would result.' He agreed, however, with the need to "proceed[] with
a cautious hand," and to "exclude[ ] as much as possible the influence of the
Legislature."'5 Rufus King again noted that impeachments would only be necessary
if the Executive "held his place for life, and was not periodically elected... the
periodical responsibility to the electors being an equivalent security."''
Madison supported the idea of impeachment, as "[t]he limitation of the period of
his service, was not a sufficient security" against the "incapacity, negligence or
142 Id. at331.
143 Id.
144 Id.
145 Id.
146 Id. at 333.
147 Id.
149 Id.
149 Id. at 333-34.
11o Id. at 334.
15' Id.
152 Id.
153 Id.
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perfidy of the chief Magistrate."' 54 He feared the Executive "might lose capacity
after his appointment... [or] pervert his administration into a scheme of peculation
or oppression ... [or] betray his trust to foreign powers.""' Because the Executive
was to be administered by a single man, Madison thought, "loss of capacity or
corruption was more within the compass of probable events, and either of them might
be fatal to the Republic."' 56 It is important to note that Madison's concerns arose
because, unlike the final draft of the Constitution, the draft under discussion here did
not provide a non-impeachment means of removing from office an Executive who had
become incapacitated. As ultimately ratified, the Constitution separated the power
of impeachment from the issue of removal due to the President's "Death, Resignation
or Inability to discharge the Powers and Duties" of his office;' impeachment was
reserved as a limited means of removal for a specific set of circumstances."'s
Gouvernor Morris changed his mind during the discussion and came to agree that
impeachment would be necessary if the Executive "was to continue for any time in
office": 159
The Executive ought therefore to be impeachable for treachery;
Corrupting his electors, and incapacity were other causes of impeachment.
For the latter he should be punished not as a man, but as an officer, and
punished only by degradation from his office. .... When we make him
amenable to Justice however we should take care to provide some mode
that will not make him dependent on the Legislature. 60
On the question of whether the Executive should be removable by impeachment, the
motion passed by a margin of eight to two.' 6'
The issue of impeachment, along with a number of other troubling issues for the
Convention, was given to a Committee of Eleven who, it was hoped, would be able
to design efficient compromises. 62 On September 4, the Committee reported to the
114 Id. at 332.
155 Id.
156 Id. at 333.
' U.S. CONST. art. II, § 1, cl. 6; see also U.S. CONST, amend. XXV, §§ 3-4 (defining
further the circumstances under which a President may be declared "unable to discharge the
powers and duties of his office," either by his own declaration, or by the written declaration
of the Vice President along with specified other officers, transmitted to the President pro
tempore of the Senate and the Speaker of the House).
... See U.S. CONST. art. II, § 4 (specifying that the President, among others, "shall be
removed from Office on Impeachment for, and Conviction of, Treason, Bribery, or other
high Crimes and Misdemeanors").
"' MADISON'S NOTES, supra note 44, at 335.
160 Id.
161 See id
16' See id. at 569 (appointing the committee); see also id. at 573 (receiving the report
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Convention its recommendations with respect to the provisions pertaining to the
executive branch. 63 In large measure, the proposal as presented became in substance
the text of Article II in the final draft of the Constitution. The President would hold
office for four years (with no limitation as to re-election), and he would be elected by
electors in the same manner as in the final Constitution-not by the Legislature. 16
As for impeachment, the report read simply that "[h]e shall be removed from his
office on impeachment by the House of Representatives, and conviction by the
Senate, for Treason, or bribery."'' 65
George Mason objected to the limitation on impeachment to treason and bribery,
arguing that "[t]reason as defined in the Constitution will not reach many great and
dangerous offenses. ... Attempts to subvert the Constitution may not be Treason
as above defined."' 66 Thus, Mason moved to add "or maladministration" to the
actions giving rise to impeachment.'67 James Madison objected to this addition
because "[s]o vague a term will be equivalent to a tenure during pleasure of the
Senate."' 68 Gouvernor Morris thought the amendment could do no harm and would
never be "put in force" because an "election every four years will prevent
maladministration."' 69 Mason withdrew "maladministration" and substituted "other
high crimes & misdemesnors ag[ainst] the State,"'' 0 which passed by a vote of eight
to three'7' and was clarified a short time later to read "against ... [the] United
States."'1
72
Some debate ensued on the issue of whether the President should be tried by the
Senate. Madison and Charles Pinckney thought this made the President too
dependent on the Legislature. 73 Pinckney argued, "If he opposes a favorite law, the
two Houses will combine ag[ainst] him, and under the influence of heat and faction
throw him out of office."'' 74 Madison's motion to delete the words "by the Senate"
failed, nine votes to two.'"7
Later that day, all the provisions that had been amended during debate were sent
to a committee appointed "to revise the stile of and arrange the articles which had
from the committee).
163 See id. at 573-75.
'64 See id at 574 (§ 4).
165 Id. at 575 (§ 9).
166 Id. at 605.
167 Id.
168 Id.
169 Id.
170 id
171 See id
172 Id. at 606.
173 See id at 605-06.
174 Id. at 606.
175 See id.
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been agreed to by the House."' 17 6 The document that emerged from the "Committee
of Stile and arrangement" was the penultimate draft of the Constitution; with respect
to Article II, defining the Executive, there was little subsequent debate and no debate
at all on the fourth section, which pertained to impeachment.'77 Perhaps unnoticed,
and certainly not remarked on by the delegates (for no one drew attention to the fact),
George Mason's amendment that added "against the United States" was dropped
from the impeachment section. That section now read: "The president, vice-president
and all civil officers of the United States, shall be removed from office on
impeachment for, and conviction of treason, bribery, or other high crimes and
misdemeanors."'' 78 Section Four would continue to read this way when ratified in the
Constitution.
79
III. IMPLICATIONS OF THE TWENTY-SECOND AMENDMENT FOR
THE STRUCTURE OF THE IMPEACHMENT POWER
The debates at the Constitutional Convention show that the length of the
President's term of office changed as the delegates constructed the internal and
external balance of the Executive. The Framers debated at length the duration of the
Executive's term-seven years? six years? four years? two years? for life? during the
Legislature's pleasure?-and whether to limit the number of terms for which the
President would be eligible. Ultimately, they decided on a relatively short four-year
term, with eligibility for re-election-and potentially for multiple re-elections. The
Framers established these provisions, however, only after balancing the other
elements of the Executive with the Legislature: the President would not be elected by
the Legislature; his veto power was carefully balanced and only could be overridden
by a two-thirds vote; although he was given the role of Commander in Chief, the
power to declare war rested in the Congress; and the Executive would be comprised
of one individual rather than a committee.
Impeachment was another variable in the constitution of the Executive, a variable
that was even more closely tied to the length of the Executive's term and the issue of
re-eligibility than the variablesjust mentioned. When debating whether the Executive
should serve for life, most delegates thought impeachment was a necessary power for
the Legislature. The same argument for impeachment's necessity arose during
discussion of the Executive serving at the pleasure of the Legislature. However,
neither of these term options had broad-based support during the Convention: one
176 Id. at 608.
" See id at 645-47 (debating for the last time various aspects of Article II).
.7. Id. at 624.
' See U.S. CONST. art. II, § 4.
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clearly would be too close to a monarchy, while the other would make the Executive
overly dependent on the Legislature. 0
The real tug-of-war happened in the middle ground, when deciding the length of
the President's term and whether he would be eligible for re-election. Here, the
impeachment variable played a crucial role. Many of the delegates opposed
impeachment when the Executive was allowed only one term in office. Giving the
power of impeachment to the Legislature in that situation, they argued, would only
make the Executive dependent upon it.'8 ' Allowing the Executive multiple terms in
office, however, a provision accepted in the ultimate draft of the Constitution, raised
other concerns. The delegates realized the benefits of allowing a wise, experienced,
and efficient Executive to continue to serve over an extended period of time if
continually re-elected. 2 Implied also is a corollary: just as the people may choose
80 See supra text accompanying notes 78-104.
81 See, e.g., MADISON'S NOTES, supra note 44, at 358-61 (debating the eligibility of the
Executive for additional terms in office).
182 During debate on the length of the Executive's term in office and whether the term
should be renewable, James Wilson of Pennsylvania averred that a natural equilibrium of
sorts would be established as to the duration of the Executive's term in office: "[Alt a
certain advance in life, a continuance in office would cease to be agreeable to the officer,
as well as desirable to the public." Id., at 358-59. Wilson noted, however, "Experience [has]
shewn in a variety of instances that both a capacity & inclination for public service
existed-in very advanced stages," and he bemoaned arbitrary limitations on the
Executive's term:
If the Executive should come into office at 35 years of age, which ... may
happen & his continuance should be fix[ed] at 15 years[,] at the age of 50 in the
very prime of life, and with all the aid of experience, he must be cast aside like
a useless hulk.
Id. at 359.
Alexander Hamilton, in Federalist 72, made the same general point with a different
emphasis. A principle advantage, Hamilton argued, of having the President eligible for
multiple terms is "to prolong the utility of his talents and virtues, and to secure to the
government the advantage of permanency in a wise system of administration." THE
FEDERALIST NO. 72 supra note 34, at 463 (Alexander Hamilton). Continuing, Hamilton
argued that an "ill effect" of excluding the President from multiple terms is that doing so
would:
depriv[e] the community of the advantage of the experience gained by the chief
magistrate in the exercise of his office. That experience is the parent of wisdom,
is an adage the truth of which is recognized by the wisest as well as the simplest
of mankind. What more desirable or more essential than this quality in the
governors of nations? Where more desirable or more essential than in the first
magistrate of a nation? Can it be wise to put this desirable and essential quality
under the ban of the Constitution; and to declare that the moment it is acquired,
its possessor shall be compelled to abandon the station in which it was acquired,
and to which it is adapted?
Id. at 465.
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to return a wise executive to office repeatedly, they also possess the power every four
years to remove an unwise Executive from office. At the same time, however, the
delegates harbored fears that an Executive in office for a long period of time would
accrue an inordinate amount of power and that such power would be used to corrupt
the Constitution and establish the President as a tyrannical defacto monarch. I8 3
Balancing the benefits and burdens of the Executive as constituted, the Framers gave
the power of impeachment to the Legislature to prevent Executive abuse of power.8 4
This careful balancing by the Framers of the President's term in office and
eligibility for re-election with the Legislature's power of impeachment was altered
considerably with the ratification of the Twenty-Second Amendment in 1951. That
Amendment provides in pertinent part:
No person shall be elected to the office of the President more than twice,
and no person who has held the office of the President, or acted as
President, for more than two years of a term to which some other person
was elected President shall be elected to the office of the President more
than once. I8 5
Historians have argued that the Republican Party forced this Amendment through
Congress and the state ratification process in a frustrated response to the four terms
to which President Franklin D. Roosevelt was elected. 6 Because the proper
procedure was followed for ratification, this Note does not question the Amendment's
constitutional validity, regardless of the motivation of its supporters.
The question then arises as to what effect, if any, the Twenty-Second Amendment
has on the impeachment power. In altering one of the principal elements constituting
the Executive (i.e., the renewability of the President's term in office), the Twenty-
Second Amendment reduced the power of the Presidency by altering the finely-tuned
balance of power between the Executive and Legislative branches established by the
Framers. The logic is simple: because the President is eligible for only two terms
due to the Twenty-Second Amendment, and because the impeachment power was
given to the Legislature in large measure to provide a check on a potentially multi-
183 See supra text accompanying notes 45-52; see also MADISON'S NOTES, supra note
44, at 312-13 (debating whether the Executive should serve, like the Judiciary, "during
good behavior;" George Mason, James Madison, Gouvernor Morris, and James McClurg
discussed the extent to which such an open-ended term of office would lead to a monarchy).
184 See supra text accompanying notes 122-79.
185 U.S. CONST. amend. XXII, § 1.
186 See generally Stephen W. Stathis, The Twenty-Second Amendment: A Practical
Remedy or Partisan Maneuver?, 7 CONST. COMMENTARY 61 (1990) (providing a sound
account of the congressional debates and ratification process, and arguing that Republicans,
joined by southern Democrats who were angry at President Harry S Truman, provided the
impetus for the Amendment).
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term President, and because the Legislature's power of impeachment is undiminished
by the Twenty-Second Amendment, the power of the Executive, therefore, has
decreased in relation to that of the Legislature.
The diminution of the President's power has not been merely theoretical. The
impact of the Twenty-Second Amendment has changed the complexion of a
President's second term. First, any second-term President is now a "lame duck,"
whose power (measured by his effective influence on the Legislature) decreases the
closer his second term comes to its end. Second, because he is ineligible for a
subsequent term, a second-term President need not be as responsive to domestic
issues as he might otherwise be. The conventional wisdom is that second-term
Presidents begin looking toward their "place in history"; as such, foreign affairs
issues, such as brokering peace treaties, often take precedence over more mundane
domestic issues.
Returning to the issue of the impeachment power, its purpose is to allow
Congress a means to remove from office a President who has committed treason,
bribery, or "other high crimes and misdemeanors." The principal effect of the
Twenty-Second Amendment on the impeachment power is that impeachment, when
viewed from the Framers' perspective, is now less necessary. The Framers feared an
abusive President who would become a defacto monarch by corrupting his electors
into continually returning him to office, or who would take control of the military and
use it to keep himself in power.'87 Because the President can now serve a maximum
of only eight years, the possibility of continued, long-term abuse of office is limited;
the impeachment power should be limited accordingly.
First, the impeachment power should be limited by construing the phrase "high
crimes and misdemeanors" to encompass principally those actions by a President that
corrupt his office, in the eighteenth-century sense of the term "corrupt."' 8 That is,
impeachment should lie principally for actions by a President that tend to imbalance
the power accorded to the Executive in relation to the Legislature or the Judiciary.
For instance, a President may be subject to impeachment for attempting to use the
power of his office to influence (outside of appropriate channels) the decision of the
Supreme Court on a case before it.
To be sure, such issues are not always clear cut. For example, one questions
whether President Franklin D. Roosevelt should have been subject to impeachment
for attempting to pack the Supreme Court in 1937. One also questions whether he
should have been subject to impeachment if his efforts had been successful. The
court-packing plan stemmed from Roosevelt's desire that the Court bend to his will
by ceasing to invalidate New Deal legislation. 8 9 He articulated the threat in terms
187 See supra text accompanying notes 48-52, 107-11.
188 See supra text accompanying notes 24-26.
189 See ROBERT H. JACKSON, THE STRUGGLE FOR JUDICIAL SUPREMACY 86-123, 176-96
(1941) (discussing the Court's nullification of the early New Deal and providing a friendly
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of the need to "save the Constitution from the Court and the Court from itself.' 9
Specifically, Roosevelt implied that many of the justices were so old that their
judgment was impaired. His plan, therefore, sought to add one justice to the bench
for every "incumbentjudge[ ] of retirement age who do[es] not choose to retire or to
resign."'' Clearly, Roosevelt sought a means around the constitutional provision of
lifetime tenure for federal judges; because he could not remove the justices who
disagreed with his legislative plan, he sought to dilute their power. Roosevelt also
sought tojustify the court-packing plan by asserting that the Court's recentjudgments
holding unconstitutional several pieces of New Deal legislation were themselves an
unconstitutional extension ofjudicial power into the province of the Legislature and
the Executive. 9"
One can argue that Roosevelt sought, under the guise of a national emergency,
to co-opt the Court's decision-making process and its judicial independence and to
subordinate the Court to Executive will. Such an attempt would seem to "corrupt"
the balance of power between the Executive and the Judiciary in precisely the way the
Framers feared. The means Roosevelt proposed to influence the Court's decision-
making, however, were, at least in form, constitutional: he simply sought to exploit
Congress' power to expand the size of the Court.'93 The Senate Judiciary Committee,
however, viewed Roosevelt's plan as an "utterly dangerous abandonment of
constitutional principle," recommending its rejection in the most earnest language:
[Under] the form of the Constitution it seeks to do that which is
unconstitutional. [I]ts practical operation would be to make the
Constitution what the executive or legislative branches of the Government
choose to say it is-an interpretation to be changed with each change of
administration. It is a measure which should be so emphatically rejected
that its parallel will never again be presented to the free representatives of
the free people of America. 94
interpretation of why FDR's court-packing plan was necessary).
190 Franklin D. Roosevelt, Radio Address of March 9, 1937, in GERALD GUNTHER &
KATHLEEN M. SULLIVAN, CONSTITUTIONAL LAW, at- 184 (13th ed. 1997) [hereinafter Radio
Address].
191 Franklin D. Roosevelt, Message to Congress, February 5, 1937, in GUNTHER &
SULLIVAN, supra note 190; at 183.
'9 See Radio Address, supra note 190, at 184.
'9' This power has been implied from Article III, section 1, clause 2 of the Constitution,
which gives to Congress the power to "ordain and establish" courts inferior to the Supreme
Court. Congress assumed the power to articulate the size of the Supreme Court in the
Judiciary Act of 1789. See ERWIN CHEMERINSKY, CONSTITUTIONAL LAW: PRINCIPLES AND
POLICIES 32-33, 186-87 (1997).
114 Report of the Senate Judiciary Committee, June 14, 1937, reprinted in GUNTHER &
SULLIVAN, supra note 190, at 184 (alteration in original).
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The abstract question of whether Roosevelt should have been impeached for the
court-packing scheme, although interesting, is not the focus of the argument here.'95
The important point is that this sort of attempt at a broad assertion of executive
power over a co-equal branch of government-an assertion that, if effected,
essentially would have made the target branch, the Judiciary, subservient to the
Executive-is precisely the type of action that the Framers envisioned as an
impeachable offense.'96
The second type of actions to which impeachment should extend are those that
a President may undertake that subvert the government, or, in the words proposed by
George Mason and adopted by the Convention, those actions that are "against the
United States."' 97 There are a number of reasons why the phrase "high crimes and
misdemeanors" should be construed narrowly in this manner. First, such an
interpretation of the phrase extends from the context in which it is found. Article II,
section 4 states that the President "shall be removed from Office on Impeachment for,
195 Regardless of one's personal views on the Roosevelt Administration or New Deal
legislation in general, it seems in hindsight that given the nation's precarious social,
political, and economic climate in the depths of the Depression, it was probably fortuitous
that any thoughts that members of Congress may have harbored as to the impeachment of
Roosevelt did not come to fruition.
The question of impeaching Roosevelt, though undoubtedly some Republicans would
have favored it, also was unfeasible politically, as Roosevelt had been re-elected in 1936
with one of the most impressive mandates in American presidential history. Roosevelt won
27.7 million out of about 44.4 million of the popular votes cast (60.8%), but secured an
extraordinary 523 out of 531 electoral votes-the electors of every state except Maine and
Vermont. See I CONG. QUARTERLY'S GUIDE TO THE PRESIDENCY 375 (Michael Nelson ed.,
2d ed. 1996); see also JACKSON, supra note 189, at 176 (discussing FDR's impressive
victory, but providing slightly different vote tallies); ARTHUR M. SCHLESINGER, JR., THE
POLITICS OF UPHEAVAL 642-43 (1960) (same).
196 Madison favored giving the Legislature the power of impeachment, for he feared that
the "incapacity, negligence or perfidy of the chief Magistrate"-specifically, that the "loss
of capacity or corruption" of the President "might be fatal to the Republic." MADISON'S
NOTES, supra note 44, at 332-33. Madison's concerns about problems arising from the
President's loss of capacity have since been addressed by the Twenty-Fifth Amendment,
discussed supra at note 157, leaving corruption as the remaining justification for the
impeachment power. In 18th-century Anglo-American political discourse, "corruption"
referred fundamentally to the aggrandizement of power by one branch of government at the
expense of another. See supra text accompanying notes 23-25, 35-44; see also THE
FEDERALIST NO. 78, supra note 34, at 491 (Alexander Hamilton) (stating that "the judiciary
is beyond comparison the weakest" of the three branches of government, so although
"individual oppression may now and then proceed from the courts of justice, the general
liberty of the people can never be endangered from that quarter ... so long as the judiciary
remains truly distinct from both the legislature and the Executive." (emphasis added)).
197 MADISON'S NOTES, supra note 44, at 605-06; see also supra text accompanying notes
162-68.
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and Conviction of, Treason, Bribery, or other high Crimes and Misdemeanors." 198
The construction of Section 4 seems to indicate that treason and bribery are examples
of high crimes and misdemeanors-that is, not just any crime fits the category of
"high crimes and misdemeanors," but only those crimes, like treason and bribery, that
subvert the constitutionally established political system. Professor Charles L. Black
argues that the common rule of legal construction, eiusdem generis ("of the same
kind"), should apply to the definition of "high crimes and misdemeanors."' 99
According to Professor Black, the phrase "high crimes and misdemeanors" extends
logically from the preceding two words, "treason" and "bribery"; thus, "high crimes
and misdemeanors" are those actions that are "of the same kind" as treason and
bribery.2"' Professor Raoul Berger agrees: "[T]he association, as a matter of
construction, of'other high crimes and misdemeanors' with 'treason, bribery,' which
are unmistakably 'political' crimes, lends them a similar connotation underthe maxim
noscitur a sociis '.""' A simple definition of the kind of offense addressed in Article
II, section 4, suggests Professor Black, would not include all crimes, but specifically
would include those offenses "which in some way corrupt or subvert the political and
governmental process ....202
The history of the phrase "high crimes and misdemeanors" provides a second
reason to construe it narrowly to apply only to executive acts that subvert the
governmental system. Professor Raoul Berger, among others, has argued that the
phrase is deeply rooted in English law and that "'[h]igh crimes and misdemeanors'
were a category of political crimes against the state."20 3 That is, such high crimes
were political specifically because they were against the state. Professor Berger
states that "high misdemeanors," for example,
are contempts against the King's prerogative, against his person and
government, against his title, "not amounting to treason," in a word,
"political crimes." Treason is plainly a "political" crime, an offense
against the'State; so too bribery of an officer attempts to corrupt
administration of the State. Indeed, early in the common law bribery "was
19' U.S. CONST. art. II, § 4 (emphasis added).
9 See CHARLES L. BLACK, IMPEACHMENT: A HANDBOOK 36-37 (1974).
200 Id. at 37.
201 BERGER, supra note 122, at 65. According to Black's Law Dictionary, "noscitur a
sociis" means:
It is known from its associates. The meaning of a word is or may be known from
the accompanying words. Under the doctrine of "noscitur a sociis ", the meaning
of questionable or doubtful words or phrases in a statute may be ascertained by
reference to the meaning of other words or phrases associated with it.
BLACK'S LAW DICTIONARY 1060 (6th ed. 1990).
202 BLACK, supra note 199, at 37.
203 BERGER, supra note 122, at 64.
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sometimes viewed as high treason." . . . In sum, "high crimes and
misdemeanors" appear to be words of art confined to impeachments,
without roots in the ordinary criminal law and which ... had no relation
to whether an indictment would lie in the particular circumstances.0 4
Therefore, while the criminal law applied to "misdemeanors" and "crimes," the
uniquely political punishment of impeachment applied to the uniquely political acts
constituting "high crimes" and "high misdemeanors.20 5 Indeed, as Professor Berger
argues, the phrase is unique to the realm of impeachments and was not employed
outside that context in the common law.206 Professor Michael Gerhardt has argued
similarly: "In England, the critical element of injury in an impeachable offense was
injury to the state." '
We have noted how the debates at the Constitutional Convention resolved that the
language of Article II, section 4 should read "high crimes and misdemeanors against
the United States," but that the last clause was dropped in the Committee on Stile and
Arrangement.0 8 While this alteration by the Committee seems problematic, in fact
it did not reflect a change in the Framers' intent. The Committee on Stile and
Arrangement had no authority to change substantively the text of the Constitution;
rather, its job was to put the document in order and to polish the prose where
necessary. 209 The intent of the Framers, then, as resolved in debate on the Convention
floor, was that "high crimes and misdemeanors" should be limited to actions "against
the United States. 210 Indeed, it has been argued that the Committee dropped the
clause "against the United States" because it was redundant-as impeachment could
only lie for actions against the state, which, in the context of the Federal Constitution,
could only mean the United States.'
204 Id. at 65-66.
205 See id.
206 See id. at 66-67
207 GERHARDT, supra note 123, at 103.
208 See supra text accompanying notes 166-79.
209 The Committee was appointed by the Convention solely to "revise the stile of and
arrange the articles which had been agreed to by the House." MADISON'S NOTES, supra
note 44, at 608.
210 Id. at 606. The motion to substitute "against the United States" for "against the State"
was agreed to unanimously "in order to remove ambiguity," and the question of accepting
the clause as amended passed by a vote often to one. Id.
211 The argument that the Committee on Stile and Arrangement dropped as redundant
the phrase "against the United States" is implicitly supported by Professor Berger's
argument, see supra text accompanying notes 201-06, that in the English legal tradition the
phrase "high crimes and misdemeanors" applied solely to political crimes against the state.
Indeed, it is from the English tradition that the delegates at the Constitutional Convention
derived the impeachment power in the Constitution. See BERGER, supra note 122, at 57;
see also THE FEDERALIST NO. 65, supra note 34, at 426 (Alexander Hamilton) (stating that
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CONCLUSION
At the Constitutional Convention, the Framers sought to establish a government
that was powerful without being tyrannical. To do this, they separated the functions
of government into three discrete branches so that no one branch would have
concentrated in it all the power. They sought to achieve equipoise between the three
branches, a counterbalanced system in which the inherent power in each
branch-each pulling in its own direction and each pushing against, thus restraining
the other two-would create a tension strong enough to hold the political system
together. With respect to the executive and legislative branches, the Framers
impeachable crimes are those that involve "the abuse or violation of some public trust").
The recent impeachment proceedings against President Clinton provided examples of
arguments for and against the proposition that the phrase "against the United States" was
dropped due to redundancy. See Impeachment Inquiry of President William Jefferson
Clinton: Hearing Before the House Committee on the Judiciary, 105th Cong. (Dec. 7,
1998), available in 1998 WL 846818 (F.D.C.H.) (statement of Sean Wilentz, Dayton
Stockton Professor of History, Princeton University) (stating that "many, if not most
American historians . . . hold to the view that Mason's wording ["high crimes and
misdemeanors against the United States"] ... best express[es] the letter and the spirit of
what the framers had in mind"); Impeachment Trial of William Jefferson Clinton, President
of the United States, 145 CONG. REC. S832-01, S847 (daily ed. Jan. 21, 1999) (statement
of White House Counsel Dale Bumpers) (arguing that the purpose of the Committee on
Stile and Arrangement at the Constitutional Convention was to "draft the language in a way
that everybody would understand-that is, well-crafted from a grammatical standpoint,"
and that "against the United States" was dropped because it was redundant).
But see Impeachment Inquiry of President William Jefferson Clinton: Hearing Before
the House Subcommittee on the Constitution, Committee on the Judiciary, 105th Cong.
(Nov. 9, 1998), available in 1998 WL 781692 (F.D.C.H.) (written statement of Forrest
McDonald, Historian and Distinguished University Research Professor, University of
Alabama) (stating with respect to the Committee of Stile's deletion of the phrase "against
the United States": "That was a significant deletion, for had those qualifiers been retained,
all impeachable offenses would have been limited to actions taken in the performance of
public duties."); id, available in 1998 WL 783740 (F.D.C.H.) (statement of Jonathan
Turley, J.B. and Maurice C. Shapiro Professor of Public Interest Law, George Washington
University Law School). Professor Turley stated, with respect to the phrase "against the
United States":
It is not clear, however, whether the Committee on Style and Arrangement simply
viewed this language as redundant or, alternatively, too restrictive. The Committee
on Style and Arrangement was not given authority to make major changes in such
standards and most (but not all) changes in the Committee were made for cosmetic
or consistency purposes. Nevertheless, there was no objection to the removal of a
phrase that would clearly narrow the scope of impeachments. Regardless of the
reason for this final change, the final version of "treason, bribery, and other high
crimes and misdemeanors" emerged without the potentially restrictive phrase
"against the United States."
Id., available in 1998 WL 783740 (F.D.C.H.).
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balanced the President's term of office and his eligibility for repeated re-election by
the people with the Legislature's limited power of impeachment for"treason, bribery
and high crimes or misdemeanors." Limiting the number of terms to which a
President can be elected, as the Twenty-Second Amendment does, alters the balance
between the executive and legislative branches in favor of the legislative branch.
To restore this imbalance, the impeachment power-specifically, the definition
of "high crimes and misdemeanors"-should be construed narrowly. The Framers
clearly granted the impeachment power to Congress to prevent corruption of the
Constitution by the President. That is, they sought to protect against a President
whose actions undermined the Constitution by seeking to subordinate a co-equal
branch of government to the will ofthe Executive, or whose actions were subversive
ofthe government orthe political process through treason, bribery, or other such high
crimes and misdemeanors. To place appropriate limits on the impeachment power
and to restore the balance between the legislative and executive branches, the
definition of "high crimes and misdemeanors," when applied to a President, should
reflect the qualifying phrase "against the United States," and find application only in
those acts that subvert the government or seek to usurp the power of the Judiciary or
the Legislature. By narrowly construing the impeachment power in this manner, the
balance of power between the executive and the legislative branches of the Federal
government created by the Twenty-Second Amendment can be restored.
JAMES RANDOLPH PECK
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